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ABSTRACT 
This Article discusses the interplay between the Necessary and Proper Clause and 
the Commerce Clause, particularly in light of the landmark decision of National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. First, this Article reviews the 
historical interaction between the two clauses, discussing the instances in which the 
two may have been considered together, and introducing the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence of each clause, setting the legal landscape for the NFIB v. Sebelius 
decision. Next, this Article details the three opinions from the NFIB v. Sebelius 
decision, Chief Justice Roberts’ holding, the joint concurrence, and Justice 
Ginsberg’s dissent, specifically as they relate to the interaction between the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper clause. This Article continues by 
exploring the different theories of constitutional interpretation reflected in the three 
NFIB v. Sebelius opinions. Finally, this Article concludes by proposing a “Means-
Ends Framework” to govern the relationship between the two clauses. This 
framework proposes that a federal regulation of intrastate activity is only permissible 
when it serves as a means to an effective regulation of interstate commerce, and not 
as additional end that is outside of Congress’s enumerated powers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
uppose that Congress decides tomorrow that more needs to be 
done to deal with the problem of childhood obesity.
1
 As part of a 
comprehensive plan to deal with the growing epidemic, Congress 
passes the “Child Food and Health Safety Act.”2 The Act provides, 
among other provisions, that children under the age of eighteen may 
not “buy, possess, or consume” any soft drink larger than sixteen 
ounces. Coca-Cola Inc., threatened with a decrease in profits, 
challenges this provision,
3
 arguing that it is outside Congress’s 
enumerated powers.
4
 Would this act be a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’s legislative authority? 
The government would likely support this statute under Congress’s 
authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”5 The 
federal government, since the ratification of the Constitution, has been 
universally acknowledged to be one of limited and enumerated 
powers.
6
 In contrast to the states, which have a general police power,
7
 
                                                          
1
 See generally Sabrina Tavernise, Obesity in Young Is Seen as Falling in Several 
Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/health
/childhood-obesity-drops-in-new-york-and-philadelphia.html. 
2
 This is a fictitious act created for hypothetical purposes inspired by New York 
City’s ban on restaurants selling any soft drinks larger than sixteen ounces. See 
Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans to Ban Sale of Big Sizes of Sugary 
Drinks, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31
/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-a-ban-on-large-sugared-drinks.html. 
3
 Assume for the sake of this hypothetical that Coca-Cola has standing to 
challenge the provision. 
4
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (giving Congress “all legislative Powers herein 
granted”) (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the 
legislative powers granted to Congress); U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
5
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause of the Constitution is commonly 
referred to as the “Commerce Clause.” 
6
 See note 4 and provisions cited therein; see e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (“This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of 
enumerated powers.”); NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (opinion 
of Roberts, J.) (“In our federal system, the National Government possesses only 
limited powers . . . the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal 
Government’s powers.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) 
(“[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”). 
S 
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the federal government only has the powers explicitly granted to it in 
the Constitution.
8
 During the New Deal era, the Court expansively 
interpreted Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, giving 
Congress broad leeway in using its powers.
9
 However, in the last 
twenty years, the Court has moved toward a more limited view of 
Congress’s commerce power.10 Would the “Child Food Health and 
Safety Act” survive constitutional scrutiny under this narrower view? 
To begin, the Court would likely apply the traditional three-
category Commerce Clause framework that is has recited regularly in 
its Commerce Clause cases.
11
 However, that would not be the end of 
the analysis. The Court’s recent decision in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius (hereinafter “NFIB v. Sebelius”) 
suggests that the Court would also conduct a separate inquiry into 
whether Congress has the power to enact the regulation under the 
“Necessary and Proper Clause,” which gives Congress the power to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” its enumerated powers.12 After practically ignoring this 
clause throughout the development of its Commerce Clause 
                                                                                                                                         
 
7
 Although not always easy to define, generally the state “police power” has been 
recognized to include regulations for the public health, safety, morals, and 
welfare of its citizens. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 129 (1890) (“there seems 
to be no doubt that [the police power] does extend to the protection of the lives, 
health, and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the 
public morals.”). But see generally Santiago Legarre, The Historical 
Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007) (describing 
the Court’s use of narrow and broad definitions of the term “police power” 
throughout its jurisprudence). For practical purposes, this means that state 
governments may pass any law that it deems to be in the best interests of its 
citizens unless that law conflicts with an express prohibition in the Constitution. 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578. 
8
 See note 6 and cases cited therein. 
9
 See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the expansion of Congress’s commerce power 
during the New Deal). 
10
 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the Court’s attempts to limit Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause). 
11
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005) (identifying the “three general 
categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its 
commerce power” as (1) regulating the channels of interstate commerce; (2) 
regulating the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) regulating 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
12
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause is commonly referred to as the 
“Necessary and Proper Clause.” 
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jurisprudence, the Court in NFIB v. Sebelius put the clause into the 
equation.
13
 
The apparent emergence of the Necessary and Proper Clause as an 
independent justification for federal economic regulations raises 
important questions about the scope of federal power. What role 
should the Necessary and Proper Clause play in the Court’s analysis in 
future Commerce Clause cases?
14
 Will the clause be used to extend 
federal power
15
 or to re-assert its limits?
16
 Is it implicitly included in 
the current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, or is it an additional 
extension of federal power?
17
 If it is an additional extension, what does 
it add to the analysis?
18
 
This Article argues that the views of the justices in NFIB v. 
Sebelius fail to provide an adequate framework for applying the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in relation to the Commerce Clause. 
Instead, the Court should focus on ensuring that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause provides “means” to regulate interstate commerce, 
rather than an additional enumerated power.
19
 The Necessary and 
Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate intrastate 
activities only when the regulation is used as a “means” to regulate 
                                                          
13
 All three opinions specifically addressed the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Furthermore, both Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion analyzed the regulation separately under both the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-93 
(2012) (opinion of Roberts, J.); id. at 2646-47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, 
JJ., concurring in part); id. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part); see infra 
Part III. This is in contrast to the Court’s prior Commerce Clause cases, in which 
the Court either omitted the Necessary and Proper Clause entirely, or mentioned 
it only briefly. See infra Part II.B. 
14
 See infra Part V (proposing the “Means-Ends Framework” for the relationship 
between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause). 
15
 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the “expansive approach” to Congress’s 
commerce power). 
16
 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the “limiting approaches” to Congress’s 
commerce power). 
17
 See infra Part V. 
18
 See infra Part V. 
19
 J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 584 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
“should . . . be understood to regulate the relationship between congressional 
means and constitutional ends”). 
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interstate commerce.
20
 In order to ensure that intrastate regulations 
serve only as a means and not an end, the Court should hold that an 
intrastate regulation is necessary and proper only if the regulation is 
substantially related to a larger economic scheme that predominates 
over the individual regulation.
21
 This view of the interaction between 
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is consistent with 
the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause and strikes the proper 
balance, by giving Congress flexibility to fix the means of enforcing 
its commerce power, while denying it the police power reserved to the 
states. 
Part II discusses the history of the Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses and how the Court has treated the interaction between 
the two. Part III examines the different opinions from NFIB v. 
Sebelius, applying the Necessary and Proper Clause to the individual 
mandate. Part IV examines the Court’s competing theories from NFIB 
v. Sebelius on the relationship between the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause. Finally, Part V proposes a “Means-Ends 
Framework” for the relationship between the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and the Commerce Clause, and discusses how this framework 
could be applied in future cases. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Both the Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence and 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence have created a broad, although 
limited, scope of federal power.
22
 However, the Court has rarely 
addressed the relationship between the two clauses, creating 
uncertainty about the true extent of federal power.
23
 Nevertheless, two 
common themes emerge from the case law: (1) the Justices are split in 
their opinion as to whether a “rational relationship” between a 
                                                          
20
 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); see infra 
Part V. 
21
 See infra Part V.A (describing in more detail the three-part test proposed in this 
article). 
22
 See infra Part II.A (describing the significant leeway the Court has provided 
Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause to choose the means to enforce 
its enumerated powers); see infra Part II.B (describing the broad authority the 
Court has provided Congress under the Commerce Clause to regulate economic 
or commercial activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
23
 See infra Part II.B. 
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regulation and an enumerated power is sufficient to survive 
constitutional scrutiny
24
 and (2) intrastate regulations have only been 
upheld when they are part of a larger statutory scheme that regulates 
interstate commerce.
25
 
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
The Necessary and Proper Clause applies not only to Congress’s 
commerce power, but to all of its enumerated powers.
26
 The Court’s 
application of the Necessary and Proper Clause in other contexts will 
help guide the Court in defining its relationship to the Commerce 
Clause. Any analysis of the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
the United States’ constitutional jurisprudence must start with an 
examination of Chief Justice Marshall’s landmark opinion in 
McCulloch v. Maryland.
27
 In McCulloch, the Court addressed the 
much-debated constitutional issue of whether the federal government 
had the power to incorporate a bank.
28
 The creation and chartering of a 
bank is not explicitly mentioned among Congress’s enumerated 
powers, so the only way that Congress could exercise that authority 
would be if the act of creating and chartering a bank was implied from 
its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
29
 Ultimately, the 
Court upheld the incorporation of the national bank as necessary and 
proper to the execution of Congress’s enumerated powers.30 
The Court rejected Maryland’s argument that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is not an expansive clause, but a limiting one, restricting 
Congress’s power to pass only those laws that are absolutely necessary 
                                                          
24
 See text accompanying notes 45-57, 112, 114-16, 151-54. 
25
 See text accompanying notes 65, 101, 129-32, 148-49. 
26
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the authority to “make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated 
powers). 
27
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
28
 Id. at 401 (“[H]as congress power to incorporate a bank?”); see also Keith 
Werhan, Checking Congress and Balancing Federalism: A Lesson from 
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1213, 1228 
(2000) (describing the controversy over whether the incorporation of a bank was 
within Congress’s authority as a “longstanding controversy”). 
29
 Werhan, supra note 28, at 1228 (noting that “the framers had not explicitly 
included [the power to incorporate a bank] in the Article I, Section 8 delineation 
of congressional authority”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
30
 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424. 
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for the execution of its enumerated powers.
31
 According to the Court, 
the Constitution gives Congress “great powers” to execute, and “[i]t 
can never be [the Framers’] interest, and cannot be presumed to have 
been their intention, to clog and embarrass [their] execution, by 
withholding the most appropriate means.”32 As such, the Court defined 
the word “necessary” as something “convenient or useful,” rather than 
something “absolutely necessary.”33 Therefore, because the 
incorporation of a national bank was “convenient” and “useful” toward 
the execution of Congress’s enumerated powers,34 it was constitutional 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
35
 
McCulloch stands for the general proposition that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause provides Congress with significant leeway to 
choose the means to enforce its enumerated powers, even means that 
are not “absolutely necessary” for their enactment.36 However, Chief 
Justice Marshall did not address head-on the tension between his 
observation that “[t]his government is acknowledged by all, to be one 
                                                          
31
 Id. at 412-13. 
32
 Id. at 407-08. The Court later added that a restrictive interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause would severely restrict the powers of the national 
government and therefore be “pernicious in its operation.” Id. at 416. 
33
 Id. at 413. In addition to its argument that a narrow interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause would undermine Congress’s ability to govern the 
nation, the Court also put forward numerous textual arguments to support its 
broad interpretation. First, the Court noted that the phrase “absolutely 
necessary” appears in another provision of the Constitution. Id. at 414. The fact 
that the framers chose not to use that language in Article I Section 8 suggests 
that they did not intend a narrow interpretation of Congressional authority. Id. 
The Court further argued that the inclusion of the word “proper” with 
“necessary” indicated that the framers meant to “to qualify [a] strict and 
rigorous” interpretation of the clause. Id. at 418-419. Finally, the Court noted 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause was located in the Constitution among 
Congress’s powers, further indicating that the Necessary and Proper Clause was 
intended to expand federal authority, not limit it. Id. at 419. 
34
 Id. at 422 (“That [a national bank] is a convenient, a useful, and essential 
instrument in the prosecution of [the federal government’s] fiscal operations, is 
not now a subject of controversy.”). 
35
 Id. at 424. 
36
 Werhan, supra note 28, at 1226-28 (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall’s 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause was broad); see Beck, supra 
note 19, at 601 (arguing that in McCulloch, “Marshall emphasized the federal 
government’s need for ample means to accomplish its delegated objects.”); see 
also text accompanying notes 31-35. 
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of enumerated powers”37 and his belief that Congress has discretion to 
choose the proper means.
38
 Perhaps the closest Chief Justice Marshall 
comes to addressing the outer limits of the necessary and proper power 
is with his famous quote, “[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within 
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”39 This framework, while a good starting point, leaves 
significant questions to be answered by future cases. What makes a 
particular means “appropriate” for Congress to promulgate? How tight 
of a fit is required between the means and the enumerated power to 
make it “plainly adapted?” What means are prohibited by the “spirit of 
the constitution?” Ultimately, McCulloch left the Court with two 
competing propositions, that the power of the federal government is 
clearly circumscribed to those listed in the Constitution, and that 
Congress has wide flexibility to choose the means to enforce those 
powers.
40
 
Nearly 200 years after McCulloch, the Court is still struggling to 
reconcile these competing propositions. In the 2010 case, United 
States v. Comstock,
41
 the issue was whether the federal government 
had the authority to involuntarily detain sexually dangerous federal 
prisoners after those prisoners have completed their sentences.
42
 The 
Justices essentially conceded that the detainment was not directly 
related to an enumerated power,
43
 but nevertheless upheld the 
                                                          
37
 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405. 
38
 Chief Justice Marshall hints at the potential conflict when he states that “[i]t 
is . . . the subject of fair inquiry, how far such means may be employed,” but he 
does not answer this question in his opinion. Id. at 409. 
39
 Id. at 421. 
40
 Id. at 405, 413. 
41
 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
42
 Id. at 129-30. 
43
 While not explicitly stated, the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions 
were all based on the idea that there was not a direct link between the authority 
and an enumerated power. See id. at 146 (“[T]he links between [the statute] and 
an enumerated Article I power are not too attenuated.”); id. at 150 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Respondents argue that congressional authority 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause can be no more than one step removed 
from an enumerated power. This is incorrect . . . the analysis depends not on the 
number of links in the congressional-power chain but on the strength of the 
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regulation by a 7-2 vote.
44
 The five-Justice majority emphasized the 
broad power that Congress possesses under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,
45
 articulating the standard as whether “the statute constitutes a 
means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”46 Since the link “between [the 
statute] and an enumerated Article I power was not too attenuated,” the 
Court held that the statute was within Congress’s authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.
47
 Thus, the majority applied a rational-
basis standard and found the regulation constitutional.
48
 
Justices Alito and Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but rejected 
the majority’s use of rational-basis review.49 Both concurring opinions 
expressed concern with the “breadth of the [majority’s] language” in 
its opinion.
50
 Justice Kennedy criticized the majority’s use of rational-
basis review when analyzing Congress’s powers under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause,
51
 arguing that this standard is inappropriate in a 
case that involves “powers . . . confined by the principles that control 
                                                                                                                                         
chain.”); id. at 159 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Necessary and Proper 
Clause empowers Congress to enact only those laws that ‘carr[y] into 
Execution’ one or more of the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution. 
Because [the statute] ‘execut[es]’ no enumerated power, I must respectfully 
dissent.”) (citation omitted); see also Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: 
The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power 2010 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 239, 249 (noting that the majority opinion in Comstock does not 
show a direct connection between the statute and an enumerated power). 
44
 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 128. 
45
 Id. at 133. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion of the Court, which was joined by 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Chief Justice Roberts. Id. at 128. 
46
 Id. at 134 (emphasis added). 
47
 Id. at 146. The Court also stated three other main reasons for finding that the 
statute was within Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
The Court noted that the government’s extension of power in this case: (1) was a 
“modest” extension to one it already exercised; (2) was “reasonable;” and (3) 
properly accounted for state interests. Id. at 137, 142-43. 
48
 Id. at 134, 146. 
49
 Id. at 150 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 155 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
50
 Id. at 155 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 154 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that “[T]he [majority opinion] ignores 
important limitations stemming from federalism principles.”). 
51
 Id. at 151-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Somin, supra note 43, 
at 245 (noting that in Comstock “Kennedy argued against the use of the ‘rational 
basis’ test adopted by the majority”). 
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the limited nature of our National Government.”52 Similarly, Justice 
Alito implicitly attacked the majority’s use of rational-basis review.53 
In support of his position that the statute in question was 
constitutional, Justice Alito argued that “[t]his is not a case in which it 
is merely possible for a court to think of a rational basis on which 
Congress might have perceived an attenuated link between” the means 
and an enumerated power.
54
 While Justices Kennedy and Alito joined 
the majority’s judgment, they both expressed concerns about the 
majority’s use of a lenient rational-basis review.55 
Comstock did not involve the Commerce Clause, so it is unclear if 
its holding would affect the traditional Commerce Clause analysis. 
Even if the exact analysis employed by the Justices in Comstock would 
not be relevant to a Commerce Clause case, the case offers a key 
insight into their views on the Necessary and Proper Clause 
generally.
56
 Despite the majority’s application of a lenient rational-
basis review for statutes supported by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the Court was divided as to whether a more stringent review 
should be required.
57
 Thus, the Court is currently divided as to how 
strong of a connection is required between the means and an 
                                                          
52
 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 151 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice 
Kennedy proposed instead that the Court should apply a heightened rational-
basis review that requires a “demonstrated link in fact, based upon empirical 
demonstration” in order to support a law under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. Id. at 152. 
53
 Id. at 155-58 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
54
 Id. at 158. Justice Alito wrote on the topic of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
general that “[a]lthough the term ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely 
necessary’ or indispensable, the term requires an ‘appropriate’ link between a 
power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.” Id. This 
also suggests that Justice Alito supports the idea that a standard more stringent 
than rational-basis is required in necessary and proper cases. 
55
 Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 151-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
56
 See text accompanying note 57-58. 
57
 While Justices Scalia and Thomas did not attack the rational-basis standard 
directly in their dissent, both attacked it in a prior case relating to the Commerce 
Clause. See e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment); id. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, while Chief 
Justice Roberts signed on to the opinion in full, indicating that he also supported 
the majority’s rational-basis review, Comstock, 560 U.S. at 128, his subsequent 
opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius suggests that Roberts may not be completely 
supportive of the majority’s lenient standard of review. See infra Part III.A. 
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enumerated end to justify a regulation under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.
58
 
B. The Commerce Clause 
The Necessary and Proper Clause has played an important, if often 
unexamined, role in the Court’s expansion of Congress’s commerce 
power.
59
 Over time, the Court has developed a three-category 
framework for analyzing Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause.
60
 A regulation is constitutional under the Commerce Clause if 
it regulates, (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or (3) economic or 
commercial intrastate activities that, in the aggregate, have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
61
 The influence of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause on the Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence becomes apparent when the Court started to uphold 
regulations of purely intrastate activities that had a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.
62
 However, while the Court at times used the 
language associated with the Necessary and Proper Clause, or briefly 
mentioned that the clause was relevant, there was no extended 
discussion on the precise role that the clause played until Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Gonzales v. Raich.63 As such, it is unclear 
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause is already incorporated in 
the traditional Commerce Clause analysis, or whether it constitutes an 
independent justification for Congressional regulation of economic 
activities. 
1. The Expansion of the Commerce Power 
The Court’s first clear indication that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause affected the Court’s analysis in a Commerce Clause case came 
                                                          
58
 See text accompanying notes 46-57. 
59
 See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
60
 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that 
“[s]ince. . . [1971], our cases have mechanically recited that the Commerce 
Clause permits congressional regulation of three categories”). 
61
 Id.; see infra Part II.B.1-2. 
62
 See infra Part II.B.1. 
63
 See infra Part II.B.1-3. 
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in the 1941 case, United States v. Darby.
64
 The issue in Darby was 
whether Congress, as part of a “comprehensive legislative scheme,”65 
had the power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of 
goods manufactured by workers whose employers did not comply with 
the maximum hours and minimum wage laws prescribed by 
Congress.
66
 The Court first held that the regulation was constitutional 
because it regulated an item that moved through interstate commerce.
67
 
The Court went on to hold that Congress’s regulation on 
manufacturing would be constitutional even without the requirement 
that the goods enter interstate commerce.
68
 
The Court, using the language from McCulloch, held that 
Congress’s commerce power included purely intrastate activities that 
affect interstate commerce.
69
 The Court held that Congress’s authority 
“extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce. . . as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the 
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”70 The Court used similar 
language when it held that Congress “may choose the means 
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even 
                                                          
64
 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Beck, supra note 19, at 617-19 
(arguing that the Court relied on McCulloch and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in upholding the statute in Darby). 
65
 Darby, 312 U.S. at 109. While the Court in Darby did not mention this as a 
factor in its decision, this distinction becomes crucial in future commerce clause 
cases, in which the Court held regulations unconstitutional in part because they 
were not part of a larger economic scheme. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 562 (1995); see infra Part II.B.2. 
66
 Darby, 312 U.S. at 105. 
67
 The Court reasoned that “[T]he power of Congress under the Commerce Clause 
is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only to the 
specific prohibitions of the Constitution.” Id. at 116. 
68
 Id. at 122. This holding is arguably dictum since the Court had already held that 
the act was constitutional because it regulated items that went through interstate 
commerce. Id. at 116. Nevertheless, this holding was highly influential and 
followed by subsequent Court decisions. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the 
Wickard Court’s adoption of this holding from Darby). 
69
 See text accompanying notes 70-72. 
70
 Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added). Compare Darby, 312 U.S. at 118, 
with McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408 (writing that “[i]t can never be [the Framers’s] 
interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and 
embarrass its execution, by withholding the most appropriate means” to 
effectuate Congress’s enumerated powers) (emphasis added). 
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though they involve control of intrastate activities”71 and that “[t]he 
means adopted by [the act] . . . is so related to the commerce and so 
affects it as to be within the reach of the commerce power.”72 Thus, 
the Court held that Congress may regulate purely intrastate activities 
as a “means” to enforce its commerce power.73 Despite the Court’s use 
of Necessary and Proper Clause language, it did not once mention the 
clause in its analysis, instead relying solely on the Commerce Clause 
in reaching its decision.
74
 Nevertheless, it is clear that the principles of 
the clause, as enunciated in McCulloch, buttressed the Court’s 
expansion of the Commerce Clause to include purely intrastate 
activities.
75
 
In Wickard v. Filburn,
76
 a case that “has long been regarded as 
‘perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause 
Authority of intrastate activity,’”77 the Court completed its expansion 
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In Wickard, the 
Court held that the federal government could limit the amount of 
wheat that a farmer produced even if the wheat never entered interstate 
commerce.
78
 The Court began its analysis in Wickard by affirming the 
principle enunciated in Darby, that Congress’s commerce power 
includes the ability to regulate intrastate activities that have a 
                                                          
71
 Darby, 312 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added). Compare Darby, 312 U.S. at 121, 
with McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”) (emphasis added). 
72
 Darby, 312 U.S. at 123. 
73
 See text accompanying notes 70-72. 
74
 Darby, 312 U.S at 123 (“The means adopted by [the act] . . . are so related to the 
commerce and so affects it as to be within the reach of the commerce power.”). 
75
 See text accompanying notes 70-72; see also Beck, supra note 19, at 617-19 
(arguing that the Court relied on McCulloch and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in upholding the statute in Darby). 
76
 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
77
 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588 (2012) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)). 
78
 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-17. The Court addresses the issue squarely when it 
acknowledged that “the [issue] would merit little consideration . . . except for 
the fact that this Act extends federal regulation to production not intended in any 
part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” Id. at 118. 
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substantial effect on interstate commerce.
79
 The Court rejected the use 
of “mechanical applications of legal formulas,” that prohibited 
regulations with “indirect” effects or that involved only 
“production.”80 Instead, it held that Congress had the authority under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate any activity that had a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.
81
 
The Court then took the analysis one step further, concluding that 
when determining whether an activity has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, the activity must be viewed in the aggregate, not 
on the effect of one occurrence.
82
 Although Mr. Filburn’s activities 
alone may not substantially affect the interstate market for wheat, “his 
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly 
situated, is far from trivial.”83 The Court reasoned that the farmer’s 
production of his own wheat, combined with the potential production 
of others, substantially affects interstate commerce.
84
 As a result, the 
Court held that Congress may, under the Commerce Clause, regulate 
the farmer’s wheat production, regardless of whether that wheat 
actually entered interstate commerce.
85
 
In sum, the Wickard Court concluded that Congress could regulate 
any intrastate activity that, considered in the aggregate, had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
86
 This formulation of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause pushed the line toward 
                                                          
79
 Id. at 124, (concluding that Congress’s commerce power “extends to those 
intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the 
exercise of” interstate commerce); see text accompanying notes 68-69. 
80
 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124. The Court further reasoned that “‘commerce among 
the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the 
course of business.’” Id. at 122 (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 
375, 398 (1905)). 
81
 Id. at 124-25 (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be 
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress 
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.”) (emphasis 
added). 
82
 Id. at 128. 
83
 Id. Growing wheat at home would allow farmers to forgo purchasing wheat 
from the market, decreasing the amount of wheat sold in commerce. Id. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. at 127-29. 
86
 See text accompanying notes 79-81. 
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the creation of a national police power.
87
 Ironically, the Court created 
such a broad formulation without reference to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. The Court only mentions the Necessary and Proper 
Clause once in the entire opinion, in the context of stating one of the 
government’s arguments supporting the constitutionality of the 
regulation.
88
 Furthermore, unlike the Court in Darby,
89
 the Court in 
Wickard did not use the language of “necessary and proper” in its 
decision, but instead relied solely on the Commerce Clause and its 
own precedent.
90
 Thus, it is unclear what role, if any, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause played in the Court’s decision. 
2. The Backlash 
For the next five decades, the Court consistently used this broad 
formulation of federal power from Wickard to uphold regulations 
under the Commerce Clause.
91
 However, the Court “shocked the legal 
community”92 with its 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez93 and 
                                                          
 
87
 See e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional 
Gestal, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 3 & n.9 (2013) (citing numerous law review 
articles that characterized that Court’s commerce clause authority after Wickard 
as unlimited); Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child 
Support Enforcement After United States v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 
1477 (1996) (“Since the New Deal, Congress has had virtually unlimited power 
to regulate under the Commerce Clause.”); Arthur B. Mark, III, Currents in 
Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A Survey, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 671, 
679-80 (2004) (“In Wickard, the Court approved Congress’s use of a virtually 
unlimited power under the Commerce Clause over intrastate activity.”). 
88
 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119 (“[T]he Government argues that the statute . . . is 
sustainable as a ‘necessary and proper’ implementation of the power of 
Congress over interstate commerce.”). Despite mentioning the argument in the 
opinion, the Court never directly responds to it. 
89
 See text accompanying notes 70-72 (describing the Darby Court’s use of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause language from McCulloch in affirming a 
congressional regulation of intrastate manufacturing). 
90
 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122-30. 
91
 See e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
Katzenbaugh v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146 (1971); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); 
see also A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 138 (2007) (noting that “[b]etween 1936 and 1995, the 
Court upheld every federal statute regulating private conduct challenged as 
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause”). 
92
 Bryant, supra note 91, at 138; Beck, supra note 19, at 615. 
93
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
310 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 294 
2000 decision in United States v. Morrison.
94
 In these landmark cases, 
the Court attempted to place limitations on Congress’s commerce 
power that were consistent with precedent.
95
 Specifically, the Court 
limited the intrastate activities Congress could regulate to economic 
activities, rejected an “attenuated” relationship between an intrastate 
activity and interstate commerce, and suggested that intrastate 
regulations were only permissible if part of a larger statutory scheme.
96
 
In Lopez, the Court held that a federal statute banning the 
possession of a gun in a school zone was unconstitutional.
97
 After 
recognizing that the Court’s jurisprudence since Darby greatly 
expanded federal power,
98
 the Court began to narrow that power 
without completely disregarding the framework that the Court had 
established.
99
 The Court differentiated the current case from the 
Court’s precedent, reasoning that the regulation “is a criminal statute 
that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of 
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms.”100 Similarly, unlike the regulations the Court had previously 
upheld, this regulation “is not an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”101 Therefore, the Court 
differentiated this case from precedent because the activity regulated 
was not economic, and the statute was not part of a larger regulatory 
scheme.
102
 
                                                          
94
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
95
 Bryant, supra note 91, at 139. 
96
 See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (imposing 
limitations on Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate activities under the 
Commerce Clause). 
97
 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
98
 Id. at 555-56. 
99
 Id. at 558-59. The Court noted that “even . . . modern-era precedents which have 
expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this 
power is subject to outer limits.” Id. at 556-57. 
100
 Id. at 561. The Court also noted that “Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most 
far reaching example of Commerce Clause Authority over intrastate activity, 
involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school 
zone does not.” Id. at 560. 
101
 Id. at 561. 
102
 Id. at 560-62. 
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Next, the Court in Lopez considered the connection between 
possessing a gun in a school zone and interstate commerce.
103
 The 
Court did not address whether Congress had a rational basis for 
finding that possession of a gun in a school zone would affect 
interstate commerce.
104
 Instead, the Court reasoned that the 
government’s argument—that guns around schools leads to crime, 
which ultimately affects interstate commerce—would, in effect, give 
Congress a police power.
105
 To accept the Government’s arguments of 
an effect on interstate commerce, the Court would have to “pile 
inference upon inference” in a way that would allow Congress to 
regulate any activity.
106
 Thus, the Court implicitly rejected a lenient 
rational-basis review and held that the connection between the 
regulation and interstate commerce was too remote to support the 
regulation under the Commerce Clause.
107
 
Five years later in United States v. Morrison, the Court showed 
that the Lopez restrictions on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority 
were here to stay.
108
 Morrison involved a federal statute that provided 
“a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence.”109 
Relying heavily on its reasoning from Lopez, the Court declared the 
law unconstitutional.
110
 In particular, the Court focused on the non-
economic nature of the activity being regulated
111
 and the attenuated 
                                                          
103
 Id. at 564 (“We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s 
arguments.”). 
104
 See id. at 564-66. 
105
 Id. at 567 (arguing that the government’s theory would “convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power”); see also id. at 
564 (“[I]f we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed 
to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate.”). 
106
 Id. at 567; see note 105. 
107
 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
108
 Bryant, supra note 91, at 145 (arguing that “the [Morrison decision] indicated 
that Lopez was not merely a solitary signal of the Court’s displeasure with 
Congress’s inattention to the limits on its own authority”). 
109
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601. 
110
 Id. at 602. “Since Lopez most recently canvassed and clarified our case law 
governing this third category of Commerce Clause regulation, it provides the 
proper framework for conducting the required analysis of § 13981 [of the 
Violence Against Women Act].” Id. at 609. 
111
 Id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity.”). 
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nature of the connection between gender-motivated violence and 
interstate commerce.
112
 Thus, the Court in Morrison reinforced the 
limitations on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority enunciated in 
Lopez, and held that the statute was unconstitutional.
113
 
While the actual impact of Lopez and Morrison on subsequent 
lower court decisions has been arguably inconsistent,
114
 the Court was 
clearly attempting to limit any further expansion of congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause. The Court limited the intrastate 
activities that Congress may regulate to economic or commercial 
activities.
115
 Additionally, the Court in both cases implicitly rejected 
rational-basis review and suggested that an attenuated connection 
between the regulation and interstate commerce was insufficient to 
support a regulation under the Commerce Clause.
116
 In neither case did 
the Court use the text of the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to support these restrictions,
117
 but instead used a 
limiting reading of precedent
118
 and emphasized fears of creating a 
                                                          
112
 Id. at 615 (arguing that the link between gender-motivated violence and 
interstate commerce was so attenuated that allowing a regulation based on such 
a tenuous link would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national 
and local authority”). 
113
 Id. at 602. 
114
 Mark A. Correro, The Lopez/Morrison Limitation on the Commerce Clause - 
Fact or Fabrication?, 14 DIGEST 17, 49 (2006) (“In some areas . . . the courts 
have severely limited the reach of the federal government by relying on Lopez 
and Morrison. In other areas . . . the courts have engaged in intellectual 
corruption in order to square the statute with the Constitution.”). 
115
 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
559-60 (1995)). However, the Court does not specifically delineate which 
activities are “commercial or economic.” Bryant, supra note 91, at 145-46. All 
that we know for sure is that violence and gun possession are not economic 
activities. 
116
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; see text accompanying notes 103-07. 
117
 Neither of the majority opinions in Lopez or Morrison mentions the Necessary 
and Proper Clause even once in their analyses. See Beck, supra note 19, at 584 
(noting that the Court did not mention the Necessary and Proper Clause in either 
Lopez or Morrison and arguing that it should have). 
118
 Prior to Lopez, the Court had not explicitly distinguished between economic and 
noneconomic local activities and indicated that any activity that had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce was within Congress’s commerce 
authority. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (“[E]ven if 
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it 
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
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national police power.
119
 The question still remained as to what role, if 
any, the Necessary and Proper Clause played in this analysis. 
3. Gonzales v. Raich and The Scalia Framework 
In its last significant Commerce Clause case prior to NFIB v. 
Sebelius, the Court reaffirmed much of its expansive Commerce 
Clause precedent without denouncing the recent limitations enunciated 
in Lopez and Morrison.
120
 In Gonzales v. Raich,
121
 the Court addressed 
whether Congress has the authority to prohibit the local cultivation and 
use of marijuana that did not enter interstate commerce
122
 as part of a 
“comprehensive regime” to eliminate the interstate market in illicit 
drugs.
123
 Relying heavily on Wickard, the Court held that the 
regulation was constitutional.
124
 
The Court began by reaffirming the notion that Congress may 
regulate purely intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.
125
 It then noted that, like the wheat produced for 
personal consumption in Wickard, the growth of home-consumed 
marijuana “affect[s] price and other market conditions” of marijuana 
and therefore has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
126
 
Finally, the Court emphasized that the proper inquiry is not whether an 
activity, if undertaken by all people similarly situated, actually has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but only whether Congress 
                                                                                                                                         
economic effect on interstate commerce.”); see text accompanying note 81. 
Nevertheless, the Court in Lopez and Morrison noted that its prior cases all 
involved economic activity, and that because possession and gender-related 
violence were not economic activities, the statutes could not be upheld. United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
119
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (arguing that the link between violence and interstate 
commerce was so attenuated that allowing regulation based on such a tenuous 
link would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local 
authority”). 
120
 See supra Part II.B.2. 
121
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
122
 Id. at 5. 
123
 Id. at 12. 
124
 Id. at 9. 
125
 Id. at 18. 
126
 Id. at 19. 
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had a “‘rational basis’ . . . for so concluding.”127 Since Congress had a 
rational basis for concluding that the defendant’s local cultivation and 
use of marijuana, combined with others who would also cultivate and 
use marijuana, would affect the interstate market for that product, the 
regulation was within Congress’s powers under the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper clauses.
128
 
The majority differentiated Raich from Lopez and Morrison in two 
ways. First, the regulation challenged here was one part of a 
“concededly valid statutory scheme” to restrict the interstate market 
for illicit drugs, whereas the provisions challenged in Lopez and 
Morrison were not enacted to achieve a larger economic objective.
129
 
Because the larger regulatory scheme in Raich would be “undercut 
unless the intrastate activity [was] regulated,” this regulation differed 
significantly from those in Lopez and Morrison.
130
 Second, unlike the 
activities in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated here were 
“the production, distribution and consumption of commodities,” which 
the Court characterized as “quintessentially economic.”131 The Court 
thus distinguished this case from Lopez and Morrison on the grounds 
that the regulation was part of a legitimate comprehensive regulatory 
scheme and regulated a “quintessentially economic” activity.132 
Unlike the Court in Wickard, the majority in Raich explicitly 
invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause in support of its decision.
133
 
                                                          
127
 Id. at 22. The Court repeated this language many times throughout the opinion; 
id. at 26 (“Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of 
commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce 
in that product.”) (emphasis added); id. at 28-29 (“[Congress’s conclusion that 
homegrown marijuana will affect the market for marijuana] is not only rational, 
but ‘visible to the naked eye’ under any commonsense appraisal of the probable 
consequences of such an open-ended exemption.”) (emphasis added). 
128
 Id. at 22. 
129
 Id. at 23. 
130
 Id. at 24-25 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
131
 Id. at 25, 26. 
132
 Id. at 24-25, 26. 
133
 Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119, with Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 
(“The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress 
by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution ‘[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ its authority to ‘regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States’ includes the 
power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with 
California law.”), and id. at 22 (“Congress was acting well within its authority to 
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However, it failed to explain what role this clause played in the 
analysis.
134
 The majority cited the Necessary and Proper Clause twice, 
once in stating the issue before the Court and once in concluding that 
the regulation was constitutional.
135
 While the majority’s inclusion of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause in the opinion suggests that it is part 
of the Commerce Clause framework, the majority’s failure to include 
the Necessary and Proper Clause during its analysis leaves it unclear 
as to what, specifically, the Necessary and Proper Clause adds to the 
Commerce Clause framework. 
However, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, argued that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause was already incorporated within the third 
category of the established Commerce Clause framework.
136
 Justice 
Scalia argued that Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate activities 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce derives not from 
the Commerce Clause itself, but from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.
137
 Consistent with this framework, Justice Scalia argued that 
the key issue when analyzing whether a regulation is necessary and 
proper to Congress’s commerce power is whether the regulation is 
“essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce.”138 
                                                                                                                                         
‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States.’”) (citation omitted). 
134
 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25, 26. 
135
 See id. 
136
 Raich, 545 U.S. at 34-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The third 
category of the established Commerce Clause framework allows Congress to 
regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 34. 
137
 Id. (arguing that intrastate activities that have an effect on interstate commerce 
“are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate 
them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, [Congress’s power 
to regulate these activities] derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
138
 Id. at 37. It is unclear exactly how strong a relationship between the regulation 
and the larger economic scheme Justice Scalia would require to justify a 
regulation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, as he uses different language 
throughout the opinion to describe this relationship, each suggesting a different 
level of connection required. At various times throughout the opinion, Scalia 
uses the terms “necessary,” “reasonably adapted” and “essential” when 
describing the required relationship between the regulation and the regulatory 
scheme. Id. at 37. What is clear is that Scalia supports the Court’s proposition 
from Lopez that the Court will not “‘pile inference upon inference’” in order to 
establish that noneconomic activity has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.” Id. at 36 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 
(1995)). 
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Justice Scalia went a step further than the majority opinion, 
challenging two of the key limitations on the commerce power 
imposed in Lopez and Morrison.
139
 Justice Scalia argued that, so long 
as a regulation is “reasonably adapted”140 to a legitimate regulatory 
scheme of interstate commerce, the intrastate activity need not be 
economic, nor need it, by itself, have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.
141
 Thus, Justice Scalia views the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as authorizing Congress to regulate any intrastate activity, 
whether economic or not, that is “necessary” to make a larger scheme 
of interstate regulation effective.
142
 
The majority opinion in Raich did not repudiate the Lopez and 
Morrison restrictions, but instead differentiated this case from those 
prior decisions.
143
 Perhaps ironically, only Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
suggested a reversal of key parts of the Court’s decisions in Lopez and 
Morrison.
144
 Justice Scalia, for the first time, explicitly stated what the 
Court in Darby had implied,
145
 that the third category of acceptable 
regulations under the Commerce Clause is derived from the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.
146
 
While no other Justice joined Justice Scalia’s concurrence,147 it is 
nevertheless important because Scalia offers a potential framework 
                                                          
139
 Id. at 35-37. 
140
 Id. at 37. 
141
 Id. at 35 (“Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce 
effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not 
themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.”). Justice Scalia reiterates 
this point multiple times in his concurrence. Id. at 36 (“[C]ongress’s authority to 
enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not 
limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.); id. at 37 (“The regulation of an intrastate activity may 
be essential to a comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though 
the intrastate activity does not itself ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”); 
id. at 40 (“That simple possession is a noneconomic activity is immaterial to 
whether it can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation.”). 
142
 See text accompanying notes 138-41. 
143
 See supra Part II.B.3. 
144
 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (arguing that an intrastate activity that Congress regulates need 
not be economic or commercial in nature). 
145
 See supra Part II.B.1. 
146
 See supra Part II.B.1. 
147
 Raich, 545 U.S. at 4. 
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that the Court could adopt in analyzing the relationship between the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Furthermore, 
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the requirement that a regulation of 
intrastate commerce be part of a “larger economic scheme” is 
supported by a majority of the Court
148
 and even finds recognition in 
Lopez.
149
 Thus, there exists some common ground around which the 
Court could form a unified theory of the relationship between the 
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. 
However, as also seen in Raich, and five years later in Comstock,
 
the Court was divided as to how strong a connection there must be 
between the activity regulated and its effects on interstate 
commerce.
150
 While joining in the Court’s judgment, Justice Scalia 
expressed support for the proposition from Lopez that the Court will 
not “‘pile inference upon inference’” to find that an intrastate 
regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
151
 This 
assertion is in tension—if not in complete conflict—with the 
majority’s repeated emphasis on a deferential rational-basis standard 
for the connection required between the activity regulated and 
interstate commerce.
152
 Furthermore, although Justice Kennedy joined 
                                                          
148
 Id. at 22 (The five person majority opinion in Raich, which included Justice 
Kennedy, who joined the majority opinions in Lopez and Morrison, emphasized 
that the statute was part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and wrote that 
“[a]s we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual 
components of [a] larger [economic] scheme”); see also John T. Parry, “Society 
Must be [Regulated]”: Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzeles v. 
Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 853, 853 (2005) (writing that “the only clear 
doctrinal result of the [Raich] decision is that pieces of comprehensive 
regulatory programs will be upheld precisely because they are part of a larger 
program.”). 
149
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (noting that the statute 
restricting possession of guns in a school zone was not “an essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated” and that the statute cannot 
be “sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of 
or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce”). 
150
 See text accompanying notes 55-58. 
151
 Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 567); see also text accompanying note 138. 
152
 Id. at 22 (stating that the proper inquiry is whether Congress had a “‘rational 
basis’” for concluding that the regulated activity has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce”); id. at 26 (“Prohibiting the intrastate possession or 
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the majority opinion in full,
153
 his subsequent concurring opinion in 
Comstock criticizing rational-basis review for Congress’s power under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause suggests that he may not support the 
majority’s lenient standard of review.154 Thus, prior to NFIB v. 
Sebelius, a majority of the Court seemed to support a more stringent 
standard of review in Commerce Clause cases than rational basis. 
III. NFIB V. SEBELIUS 
In the Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
155
 the Necessary and 
Proper Clause played a distinct, although not prominent, role in the 
Justices’ analyses.156 Each of the three opinions mentioned the 
Necessary and Proper Clause specifically and factored it into its 
analysis.
157
 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion focused on the word 
“proper,” concluding that the mandate was not “proper” within the 
meaning of the clause because it was not an “incidental power” that 
                                                                                                                                         
manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) 
means of regulating commerce in that product.”) (emphasis added); id. at 28-29 
(“[Congress’s conclusion that homegrown marijuana will affect the market for 
marijuana] is not only rational, but ‘visible to the naked eye’ under any 
commonsense appraisal of the probable consequences of such an open-ended 
exemption.”) (emphasis added). 
153
 Raich, 545 U.S. at 3. 
154
 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 150-56 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring with the judgment) (criticizing the majority’s use of rational-basis 
review when determining Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause). 
155
 The Affordable Care Act provides that individuals who are not otherwise 
covered by their employers or the government must purchase private health 
insurance or make a “shared responsibility payment” to the government. NFIB 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). The precise amount of the payment is 
to be determined by the IRS based on the individual’s annual income. Id. 
Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that the government “mandate” was not within 
Congress’s enumerated powers and therefore was unconstitutional. Id. 
156
 The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent both had a 
separate section in which they considered the mandate under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, while the joint concurrence included the clause in the context of 
the Government’s argument that the mandate was “‘integral’” to the 
effectiveness of the ACA and, as such, should be upheld. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 
2579, 2591-93; id. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part); id. at 2646-47 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part). 
157
 See note 156 and accompanying text. 
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was “narrow in scope,” but rather was one that taken to its logical 
extreme, “would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.”158 
Similarly, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, in their joint 
concurrence, focused on the “principle of enumerated (and hence 
limited) federal power” and concluded that if the government could 
mandate citizens buy a product, its power would be “limitless.”159 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, on the other hand, focused on the fact that 
the mandate was “an integral part” of the ACA’s goals to regulate the 
healthcare market, and therefore the regulation was constitutional in 
the context of this “complex regulatory program.”160 All three opinions 
represented different approaches to defining the role of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in the context of Commerce Clause cases.
161
 
A. The Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the individual mandate was 
not a “proper” use of federal power and therefore could not be upheld 
under Congress’s necessary and proper power.162 After concluding that 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause did not include the 
power to compel citizens to buy health insurance,
163
 the Chief Justice 
                                                          
158
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, J.). 
159
 Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part). Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito concurred in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
judgment with regards to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause issues, but did not join his opinion. Id. at 2575. However, they dissented 
on the Court’s holding that the mandate was constitutional under Congress’s 
taxing power. Id. For ease of reference, this Article refers to this opinion as the 
“joint concurrence.” 
160
 Id. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, which 
was joined by Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Sotomayor, concurred in the Court’s 
opinion that the mandate was constitutional under Congress’s taxing power, but 
dissented from the Court’s holding that the mandate was unconstitutional under 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 2575. For 
ease of reference, this Article refers to this opinion as “Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent.” 
161
 See infra Part III. 
162
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, J.). 
163
 Id. at 2589-91 (opinion of Roberts, J.). Roberts also rejected the argument raised 
by the government and supported by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that because 
everyone will need healthcare at some time in their life, people are always active 
in the health care market and, therefore, the mandate regulated current activity 
rather than compelled participation in it. Id. at 2591; see id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting in part). Chief Justice Roberts responded that “[t]he Commerce 
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then turned to the government’s argument under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.
164
 He started his analysis by emphasizing that the 
clause only allows Congress to exercise powers “incidental” to 
enumerated powers and not “independent power[s] beyond those 
specifically enumerated.”165 He then asserted that the mandate would 
give Congress “the extraordinary ability to create the necessary 
predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”166 This power, he 
argued, is not “narrow in scope or incidental to the exercise of the 
commerce power.”167 Thus, while the mandate may be “necessary” for 
the ACA to work, it is not “proper” and therefore not within 
Congress’s necessary and proper power.168 
B. Joint Concurrence’s Opinion 
The joint concurrence concluded that because allowing the 
individual mandate would destroy the federal system of enumerated 
power, it could not be upheld under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.
169
 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito concurred with 
Chief Justice Roberts’s holding that the mandate was unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause, but did 
not join his opinion.
170
 Unlike the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Ginsburg, the joint concurrence incorporated the Necessary 
and Proper Clause into its Commerce Clause argument, rather than 
addressing it separately.
171
 
While addressing the government’s argument that the mandate was 
an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme, the joint concurrence 
declared that “the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever 
will help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of 
                                                                                                                                         
Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from cradle to grave, 
simple because he will predictably engage in particular transactions.” Id. at 2591 
(opinion of Roberts, J.). 
164
 See id. at 2591-92. 
165
 Id. at 2591. 
166
 Id. 
167
 Id. at 2592. 
168
 Id. 
169
 Id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part). 
170
 Id. at 2575. 
171
 Id. at 2644-46 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in part). 
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commerce.”172 The joint concurrence extrapolated this point, arguing 
that Congress exceeds its necessary and proper power when “the 
congressional action directly violates the sovereignty of the States” 
and “when it violates the background principle of enumerated (and 
hence limited) federal power.”173 The joint concurrence concluded that 
the mandate “represent[s] the expansion of federal power into a broad 
new field” that would give Congress “limitless” authority.174 
Therefore, because allowing the mandate would destroy the system of 
enumerated powers, the joint concurrence concluded that it is 
unconstitutional under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses.
175
 
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the individual mandate was 
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it was 
an “essential part” of a larger regulatory scheme.176 Similar to Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent177 begins with a 
discussion of the constitutionality of the mandate under the Commerce 
Clause and then further considers it under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.
178
 After finding that the mandate was constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause,
179
 Justice Ginsburg added that “[w]hen viewed as a 
component of the entire ACA, the provision’s constitutionality 
becomes even plainer.”180 Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court has 
consistently held that a challenged provision that is an “integral part” 
of a larger regulatory scheme is constitutional, even if the same act 
individually would not be within congressional authority.
181
 Notably, 
                                                          
172
 Id at 2646. 
173
 Id.; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (holding that a 
law is not “Necessary and Proper” if it “violates the principle of state 
sovereignty reflected in . . . various constitutional provisions”). 
174
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in 
part). 
175
 Id. at 2647. 
176
 Id. at 2652 (Ginsburg J., dissenting in part). 
177
 See note 160 and accompanying text. 
178
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2618-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
179
 Id. at 2625. 
180
 Id. 
181
 Id. at 2625-26. 
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Justice Ginsburg cited Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Raich to 
support the position that each individual part of a regulatory scheme 
need not be independently authorized by the Commerce Clause.
182
 
Justice Ginsburg then noted the important role that the mandate plays 
in the ACA, allowing Congress to prohibit health insurance companies 
from withholding coverage from people with preexisting conditions 
without significantly increasing the cost of health insurance 
premiums.
183
 As such, she concluded that the mandate is essential to 
the larger regulation in the ACA and therefore within Congress’s 
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
184
 
IV. EXPANSIVE OR LIMITING? 
The opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius suggest two basic directions in 
which the Court could take its Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence. The first approach, reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent and mirroring the expansive language from McCulloch,
185
 
views the Necessary and Proper Clause as allowing Congress to enact 
any law that it could rationally conclude has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce or is an essential part of a larger scheme that 
regulates interstate commerce.
186
 This “expansive approach” to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress wide, bordering on 
infinite, latitude to choose the means to reach its regulation of 
interstate commerce.
187
 
The other approach, enunciated in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
and the joint concurrence, would limit Congress’s powers under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to those already granted explicitly in its 
                                                          
182
 Id. at 2626 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)); see supra Part II.B.3 (describing Justice Scalia’s view on the 
relationship between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce 
Clause). 
183
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2626 (Ginsburg J., dissenting in part) (“Without the 
individual mandate [the ban on denying coverage to people with pre-existing 
conditions] would trigger an adverse-selection death-spiral in the health-
insurance market; insurance premiums would skyrocket, the number of 
uninsured would increase, and insurance companies would exit the market.”). 
184
 Id. 
185
 See supra Part III.C; supra Part II.A. 
186
 See infra Part IV.A. 
187
 See infra Part IV.A. 
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commerce power and only such minor or incidental powers as may be 
necessary to enforce its commerce authority.
188
 This “limiting 
approach” would circumscribe congressional authority tightly to its 
enumerated powers and invalidate any laws that are weakly related to 
the regulation of interstate commerce and those that are so expansive 
that they run against the principle of enumerated powers.
189
 Neither 
approach, however, is sufficiently nuanced to balance the competing 
interests of congressional flexibility and the principle of enumerated 
powers. Furthermore, neither approach clearly delineates the specific 
role that the Necessary and Proper Clause plays in the analysis, 
creating uncertainty for future cases involving the Commerce Clause 
cases. 
A. The Expansive Approach 
Two separate, but interacting, ideas form the expansive approach 
to Congress’s commerce power. The first is that Congress need only 
have a “rational basis” to conclude that the means it adopts have an 
appropriate link to an enumerated power.
190
 In the context of the 
Commerce Clause, this requires that Congress offer only a “rational 
basis” to conclude that any intrastate activity, in the aggregate, has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
191
 This approach rejects the 
requirement that the regulated intrastate activity must be a commercial 
                                                          
188
 See infra Part IV.A-B. 
189
 See infra Part IV.A-B. 
190
 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2616 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) 
(“When appraising [legislation under the Commerce Clause], we ask only (1) 
whether Congress had a ‘rational basis’ for concluding that the regulated activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, and (2) whether there is a reasonable 
connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.”); 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“In assessing the scope of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority, the Court need not determine whether respondents’ 
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, 
but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.”); United States v. 
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (articulating the standard of review under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause as whether “the statute constitutes a means that 
is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 617 (1995) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he specific question before us . . . is not whether the ‘regulated 
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,’ but, rather, whether Congress 
could have had ‘a rational basis’ for so concluding.”). 
191
 See note 190 and accompanying text. 
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or economic activity.
192
 Instead, this approach would permit Congress 
to pass statutes regulating gun possession in a school zone and gender-
motivated violence because Congress could have rationally concluded, 
through a chain of causation, that these activities would affect 
interstate commerce.
193
 In the context of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause specifically, the expansive approach holds that the Court will 
not invalidate a statute so long as it “constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.”194 Provided that the Court can find a rational 
connection between a regulation and an enumerated power, it should 
not invalidate an act of Congress.
195
 
The second major theme of the expansive approach is that one 
piece of a larger regulatory scheme that is not connected directly to an 
enumerated power will not be excised from that scheme.
196
 When a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme is enacted, it is not necessary that 
each and every part of that scheme be “‘independently and directly’” 
related to an enumerated power.
197
 So long as the larger scheme would 
be “undercut” without the lesser provision, the lesser provision is 
acceptable under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
198
 
One other expansive approach to the Commerce Clause that finds 
support in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is the “collective action” 
theory.
199
 Proponents of this theory argue that the main impetus behind 
                                                          
192
 See supra Part II.B.2. 
193
 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 628-37 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
194
 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134. 
195
 See note 190 and accompanying text. 
196
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part); Raich, 545 U.S. at 
23 (“[W]e have often reiterated that where the class of activities is regulated and 
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to 
excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”). 
197
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 
(1981)). 
198
 Id. at 2626 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); see also Parry, supra note 148 
(writing that “the only clear doctrinal result of the [Raich] decision is that pieces 
of comprehensive regulatory programs will be upheld precisely because they are 
part of a larger program”). 
 
199
 See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Textualism and Federalism: The Third 
Translation of the Commerce Clause: Congressional Power to Regulate Social 
Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1206 (1998) (arguing that “courts 
could translate the list of congressional powers in Article I, Section 8 of the 
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the creation of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I Section 8 
was to empower Congress to solve interstate problems that the states 
could not handle on their own.
200
 Under this approach, the main 
inquiry is whether the issue that Congress is addressing is one that the 
individual states would have difficulty regulating on their own.
201
 If 
this is true, any regulation that is part of that larger scheme is 
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
The expansive approach gives Congress the flexibility to meet 
national problems that states are unable to handle, which was one of 
the driving forces behind the formation of the Constitution.
202
 
Furthermore, its emphasis on giving Congress leeway to pick 
individual provisions that facilitate a larger regulatory scheme 
promotes the effective “execution” of congressional enumerated 
powers. However, this approach places no meaningful limits on 
congressional authority.
203
 Congress could rationally conclude that 
nearly any activity taken in the aggregate could affect interstate 
                                                                                                                                         
Constitution to allow Congress to regulate any subject that the states cannot 
govern effectively on their own” and supporting such a change in the Court’s 
jurisprudence); Donald R. Goodson, Toward a Unitary Commerce Clause: What 
the Negative Commerce Clause Reveals About the Commerce Power, 61 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 745, 790 (“To further economic union, Congress [should be able] to 
solve collective action problems where a rule of uniformity is needed due to the 
interstate nature of a given economic activity.”). 
200
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2615 (2012) (Ginsburg J., dissenting in part) (arguing that 
Constitution was ratified mainly because “the individual States . . . often failed 
to take actions critical to the success of the Nation as a whole”); see, e.g., Neil S. 
Siegel, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: Customary 
Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 DUKE L. J. 797-98 
(2012) (arguing that “the Framers drafted Article I, Section 8 primarily to 
empower Congress to ameliorate serious problems of collective action facing the 
states”); Merritt, supra note 199, at 1210 (“By 1787, the states already had 
shown that they could not effectively regulate commerce with other nations or 
among themselves . . . The Framers addressed [this] specific problem[] in 
Section 8.”). 
201
 See notes 199-200. 
202
 See notes 199-200. 
203
 United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“I]f we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an 
individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (noting that the link between violence and 
interstate commerce was so attenuated that allowing regulation based on such a 
tenuous link would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national 
and local authority.”). 
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commerce,
204
 and the Court’s rational-basis review would permit it to 
do so.
205
 This is also true of the expansive approach to larger 
regulatory schemes. Since only a “rational relationship” is required 
between the means and the end, any provision could be upheld as 
peripherally relevant to the larger scheme. The expansive approach’s 
lenient rational-basis review does not tie Congress closely enough to 
its enumerated powers to make the limitation meaningful.
206
 
B. The Limiting Approach 
Both Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the joint concurrence in 
NFIB v. Sebelius applied a limiting approach to Congress’s commerce 
power.
207
 However, they represent two separate frameworks for 
limiting that power.
208
 The joint concurrence followed the “New 
Federalism” approach and refused to expand the scope of federal 
power past the limits established during the New Deal in order to 
avoid the creation of a national police power.
209
 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion took an originalist approach, focusing on the word 
“proper” and arguing for a very limited reading of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.
210
 While both approaches place real limitations on 
congressional power, neither creates a coherent framework that the 
Court can use going forward.
211
 
                                                          
204
 See note 203. 
205
 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (noting that if Congress could regulate possession of a 
gun in a school zone it could completely take over criminal law enforcement and 
education, areas that have historically been only the province of state 
governments). 
206
 See note 203. 
207
 See supra Part III.A (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion finding that the 
individual mandate was not constitutional under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause); see supra Part III.B (describing the joint concurrence’s opinion finding 
that the individual mandate was not constitutional under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause). 
208
 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts’s 
judgment that the mandate was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, but did not join his opinion. NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012). 
209
 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
210
 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
211
 See generally Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing the problems with the limiting 
approaches enunciated in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the joint 
concurrence). 
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1. New Federalism 
The limiting approach enunciated in the joint concurrence is 
primarily concerned with the implications of finding the individual 
mandate constitutional—mainly that such a ruling would create a 
national police power.
212
 However, similar to the Court’s rulings in 
Lopez and Morrison, the joint concurrence did not directly attack 
established New Deal precedent that greatly broadened congressional 
authority.
213
 Instead, it emphasized that going any further would create 
a congressional police power.
214
 This reflects what Professor Randy 
Barnett refers to as the “New Federalism” that emerged from the 
Rehnquist Court.
215
 According to Barnett, “New Federalism” has two 
main tenets.
216
 First, New Federalism accepts the increase in federal 
power that occurred during the New Deal, but insists that any increase 
in power above that level is unacceptable unless supported by 
extremely strong justifications.
217
 Second, New Federalism rejects any 
increase in congressional authority that those Justices believe would 
result in a congressional police power.
218
 
The “New Federalism” reflected by the joint concurrence in NFIB 
v. Sebelius places real limitations on congressional authority without 
                                                          
212
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring in 
part) (writing that, “[i]f Congress can reach out and command even those 
furthest removed from an interstate market to participate in the market, then the 
Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power”); id. (“The mandating of 
economic activity . . . is a field so limitless that it converts the Commerce Clause 
into a general authority to direct the economy.”); id. at 2647 (noting that at oral 
arguments the Government was unable to state anything the government could 
not regulate under its formulation of Congress’s necessary and proper power); 
id. at 2648 (arguing that if the mandate is upheld, “the idea of a limited 
Government power is at an end”). 
213
 See text accompanying note 95. 
214
 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2644-48 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., 
concurring in part); Randy E. Barnett, The New Originalism in Constitutional 
Law: The Gravitational force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 428 
(2013) (noting that NFIB did not raise any arguments about original meaning of 
the Necessary and Proper or Commerce Clauses or challenge the mandates the 
act placed on insurance companies, and that the Court based its decision solely 
on the unprecedented nature of the mandate). 
215
 Barnett, supra note 214, at 428-29. 
216
 Id. 
217
 Id. 
218
 Id. at 429. 
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undermining the core principles enunciated by the Court since 
Darby.
219
 This limiting approach protects against an unlimited federal 
power by emphasizing that a federal regulation not authorized under a 
specific enumerated power must actually “carry into Execution” an 
enumerated power, and is not creating a new independent authority.
220
 
Furthermore, it also protects against congressional overreaching, 
recognizing that any activity can ultimately be connected through a 
chain of inferences to interstate commerce and requires a reasonable 
connection between the means and the end of interstate commerce.
221
 
However, the New Federalist approach does not answer perhaps 
the most important question relating to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and Congress’s commerce power—where do we draw the 
line?
222
 The Court has indicated that any power that would lead to the 
creation of a police power is impermissible, but it has offered no 
principled way to determine when this line has been crossed.
223
 As 
Justice Ginsburg noted in her Sebelius dissent, any power taken to the 
extreme can become oppressive.
224
 Any step that increases federal 
power could be seen as one step down the “slippery-slope” to a police 
power.
225
 Thus, while preventing a congressional police power is a 
                                                          
219
 See text accompanying note 214. 
220
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
221
 See text accompanying note 203. 
222
 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2627-28 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in 
part) (“How is a judge to decide, when ruling on the constitutionality of a 
federal statute, whether Congress employed an ‘independent power,’ or merely a 
‘derivative’ one? Whether the power used is ‘substantive,’ or just 
‘incidental’?”). 
223
 Id. 
224
 Id. at 2625 (noting that “[w]hen contemplated in its extreme, almost any power 
looks dangerous” and later adding that “the commerce power, hypothetically, 
would enable Congress to prohibit the purchase and home production of all 
meat, fish, and dairy goods, effectively compelling Americans to eat only 
vegetables. Yet no one would offer the ‘hypothetical and unreal possibilit[y],’ of 
a vegetarian state as a credible reason to deny Congress the authority ever to ban 
the possession and sale of goods”); see Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 
(1903) (“[T]he possible abuse of a power is not an argument against its 
existence.”). 
225
 See Alicia Ouellette, Health Reform and the Supreme Court: The ACA Survives 
the Battle of the Broccoli and Fortified Itself Against Future Fatal Attack, 76 
ALB. L. REV. 87, 98 (2012) (calling the argument NFIB used, and was largely 
accepted by the Court, a “classic slippery slope argument”). 
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proper goal, New Federalism provides no way to determine when the 
line has been crossed.
226
 
Additionally, the New Federalist approach is arbitrary to the extent 
that it is not based in the text of the Constitution. For example, the 
distinction between local economic and non-economic activity, while a 
convenient way for the Court to limit federal power without 
contradicting precedent, is not a distinction supported by the text of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.
227
 In fact, the clause clearly states that 
Congress may pass “[a]ll laws which shall be necessary and proper,” 
not only a certain type or class of laws.
228
 Furthermore, why this line? 
Perhaps, as Barnett suggests, it is the best that the New Federalists can 
do.
229
 Since the New Deal expansion is now settled precedent, the 
New Federalists are trying to mitigate the damage by preventing 
further expansion.
230
 Nevertheless, drawing an arbitrary line is not the 
way to create a coherent framework moving forward. 
2. “Proper” Congressional Power 
Chief Justice Roberts’s formulation of the limiting approach is 
similar to the joint concurrence’s approach, but rather than focusing 
solely on general principles of federalism, he justifies his limited 
reading by focusing on the word “proper.”231 While Chief Justice 
Roberts offers no authority that directly supports the proposition that 
an act can be “necessary” but not “proper,” he does cite Printz v. 
United States earlier in that section.
232
 In Printz, the Court held that the 
                                                          
226
 See text accompanying notes 222-25. 
227
 Barnett, supra note 214, at 431 (noting that many law professors have criticized 
the court’s economic noneconomic distinction drawn in Lopez and Morrison as 
arbitrary and unrelated to the Constitution’s text). 
228
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 640 (1995) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a categorical rule prohibiting Congress from 
regulating noncommercial activity is textually suspect considering that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to enact all powers that are 
necessary and proper). 
229
 Barnett, supra note 214, at 428-29; see also Beck, supra note 19, at 622 (arguing 
that the economic/noneconomic distinction in Lopez and Morrison could be 
viewed “as an interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause designed to 
prevent Congress from employing means remote from its power to regulate 
interstate commerce”). 
230
 See note 229. 
231
 See supra Part III.A; NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-92 (2012). 
232
 Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997)). 
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federal government could not compel state officers to enforce federal 
law.
233
 In responding to the dissent’s argument that Congress had 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to use state officials 
to enforce federal law,
234
 the majority held that because the statute 
violates the principle of state sovereignty, it was not a “proper” 
exercise of congressional power.
235
 
The majority in Printz cited no case law to support its claim that a 
law can be “improper,”236 but rather referred to an article authored by 
Professors Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger.
237
 In this article, 
Lawson and Granger argue that when the Necessary and Proper Clause 
was enacted, the terms “necessary” and “proper” had distinct meanings 
and thus are not synonymous.
238
 For an act to be “proper,” it must be 
one that does not tread on individual rights, state’s rights, or the 
separation of powers.
239
 As such, Congress may not “regulate or 
prohibit activities that fall outside the subject areas specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution.”240 Rather, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause solely authorizes Congress “to provide enforcement machinery, 
prescribe penalties, authorize the hiring of employees, appropriate 
funds, and so forth to effectuate” an enumerated power, not to create 
new powers to make the enforcement of the enumerated power more 
efficient.
241
 
                                                          
233
 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
234
 Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
235
 Id. at 924 (majority opinion). The idea that a statute is not “proper” if it violates 
state sovereignty is also reflected in the joint concurrence’s position that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause does not allow Congress to pass a statute if it 
violates the principles of state sovereignty or enumerated powers. See text 
accompanying note 173. 
236
 521 U.S. at 924. 
237
 Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
238
 Id. at 272, 286, 289-97. 
239
 Id. at 272, 336. Lawson and Granger refer to their approach as the “jurisdictional 
meaning” of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
240
 Id. at 331. 
241
 Id. (“To carry a law or power into execution in its most basic sense means to 
provide enforcement machinery, prescribe penalties, authorize the hiring of 
employees, appropriate funds, and so forth to effectuate that law or power. It 
does not mean to regulate unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of 
enumerated powers more efficient.”). 
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Similar to the New Federalism approach, this approach would 
impose substantial limitations on Congress’s authority.242 However, 
Lawson and Granger’s originalist approach is subject to many of the 
same criticisms of the New Federalist approach; specifically, when 
does a regulation cross the line from being an acceptable enforcement 
mechanism to an impermissible regulation that violates the principles 
of federalism, individual rights, or the separation of powers?
243
 
However, assuming the historical veracity of their claims,
244
 this 
approach—unlike New Federalism—is supported textually through the 
use of the word “proper.”245 
Nevertheless, this approach has two significant problems of its 
own. First, it would appear to give Congress little flexibility to deal 
with modern-day problems.
246
 Rather, it would only allow Congress 
the most basic enforcement mechanisms for regulating interstate 
commerce.
247
 The second related, and perhaps most daunting, problem 
with this approach is that it is contrary to the vast majority of the 
Court’s jurisprudence.248 In McCulloch, the Court stated the basic 
principle that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress leeway 
to choose reasonable means to enforce their enumerated powers.
249
 
Furthermore, the Court, since Darby, has expanded the clause well 
                                                          
242
 See text accompanying notes 219-21. 
243
 See text accompanying notes 222-25. 
244
 Granger and Lawson admit to “serious flaws in the documentary record,” but 
nonetheless conclude that these flaws do not undermine their thesis. See 
Lawson, supra note 237, at 334-35. A recent article by Professor John Mikhail 
challenges Granger and Lawson’s argument that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, as understood at the time it was written, limited congressional authority 
to its enumerated powers. John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 
102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1057-58 (2014) (arguing that the enumeration of three 
distinct Necessary and Proper Clauses suggests that “the Constitution vests the 
Government of the United States with implied or non-enumerated powers, 
which go beyond the enumerated powers” and that these implied powers “were 
part of an original understanding of the Constitution” when drafted 225 years 
ago). Whether or not Granger and Lawson’s historical argument is factually 
correct is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article explores what the 
legal and practical significance of their approach would be. 
245
 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
246
 See text accompanying note 241. 
247
 See id. 
248
 See supra Part II.B.1 
249
 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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beyond what would seem appropriate under this approach,
250
 requiring 
an extensive, and very unlikely, change in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Thus, the originalist approach, proposed by Lawson and Granger and 
suggested by Chief Justice Roberts, is both too inflexible and too 
radical to be a viable framework in future Commerce Clause cases.
251
 
V. THE MEANS-ENDS FRAMEWORK 
In order to define the relationship between the Commerce Clause 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is important first to delineate 
the different roles that each plays. Justice Scalia’s framework from his 
concurrence in Raich lays a strong foundation for such delineation.
252
 
The Commerce Clause, as one of Congress’s enumerated powers, 
gives Congress direct authority to regulate interstate commerce.
253
 As 
such, the first two categories of the traditional Commerce Clause 
framework—Congress’s ability to regulate the channels and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce—derive directly from that 
enumerated power, as these are “the ingredients of interstate 
commerce itself.”254 However, a regulation of purely intrastate 
activities, by definition, is not a regulation of interstate commerce.
255
 
Thus, congressional authority to regulate purely intrastate activities 
cannot come solely from the Commerce Clause.
256
 
                                                          
250
 See supra Part III.B.1. 
251
 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2628-29 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in 
part) (“In the early 20th century, this Court regularly struck down economic 
regulation enacted by the peoples’ representatives in both the States and the 
Federal Government. The Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause opinion, and . . . the 
[joint concurrence’s] reasoning, bear a disquieting resemblance to those long-
overruled decisions.”). 
252
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34-38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
253
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the authority to “[t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several states”). 
254
 Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
255
 Id. (arguing that intrastate activities that have an effect on interstate commerce 
“are not themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to regulate 
them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather, [Congress’s power 
to regulate these activities] derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
256
 Id. 
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The Necessary and Proper Clause, in contrast to the Commerce 
Clause, gives Congress no additional independent authority.
257
 Rather, 
it offers Congress the choice of means that are “necessary and proper” 
to “execute” its enumerated powers.258 Therefore, any power not 
directly supported by an enumerated power is only permissible if it is 
used as a means, not an independent end. Since intrastate regulations 
often may support Congress’s policies with regard to interstate 
commerce, such regulations may be permissible under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.
259
 Therefore, any congressional regulation of an 
intrastate activity, while impermissible under the Commerce Clause, 
may be permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
260
 
In sum, the Commerce Clause only authorizes Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce directly, while the Necessary and Proper Clause 
authorizes Congress to enact means to effectuate those regulations. 
The regulation of intrastate activities can serve as an effective means 
to enforce a regulation of interstate commerce.
261
 Consistent with this 
“Means-End Framework,” congressional regulation of intrastate 
                                                          
257
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause “does 
not license the exercise of any [powers] beyond those specifically enumerated”). 
258
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819) 
(holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to enact 
legislation which is a reasonable or “useful” means to enforce its enumerated 
powers); see also Beck, supra note 19, at 584 (arguing that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause “regulate[s] the relationship between congressional means and 
constitutional ends”). But see Mikhail, supra note 244, at 1054, 1057-58 
(arguing that the text and history surrounding the drafting of the Necessary and 
Proper Clauses imply that Congress is vested with some unenumerated powers, 
but declining to answer the question of which unenumerated powers it vests with 
them). 
259
 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (finding that 
regulating the amount of wheat a farmer grew for personal consumption aided in 
Congress’s attempts to stimulate the market for wheat); Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 
(finding that prohibiting the production and consumption of marijuana for 
personal use aided Congress’s regulation of the interstate market for marijuana). 
260
 Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress’s regulatory authority 
over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce . . . 
derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
261
 See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (finding that regulating the amount of 
wheat a farmer grew for personal consumption aided in Congress’s attempts to 
stimulate the market for wheat); Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 (finding that prohibiting 
the production and consumption of marijuana for personal use aided Congress’s 
regulation of the interstate market in marijuana). 
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activities should only be permissible through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause if they are a means to enforcing a regulation of interstate 
commerce.
262
 
A. Three-Prong Test 
Once the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause is defined as 
providing the means to enforce Congress’s enumerated powers, the 
next question is, what means are permissible? In determining whether 
an intrastate regulation is permissible under the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses, the Court should adopt a three-part test. 
This test is a variation on the Court’s traditional formulation of 
intermediate scrutiny.
263
 First, the regulation must be part of a larger 
statutory scheme that predominates over the individual regulation.
264
 
Second, the larger statutory scheme must directly regulate interstate 
commerce.
265
 Finally, the regulation must substantially relate to the 
economic and/or commercial goals of the larger scheme.
266
 This test 
emphasizes the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause to provide 
means to enforce a power, rather than an additional power.
267
 
Furthermore, it gives Congress the flexibility to choose the means of 
executing its powers without giving it a national police power.
268
 
1. “Carrying into Execution” 
Any federal regulation of a purely intrastate activity should be 
constitutional only if it is part of a larger statutory scheme. The 
Necessary and Proper clause explicitly ties congressional power to its 
                                                          
262
 Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
263
 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (defining intermediate scrutiny in the 
context of an equal protection challenge to a gender classification as requiring 
that the classification serve an important government interest and be 
substantially related to meeting that objective). 
264
 See infra Part V.A.1. 
265
 See infra Part V.A.2. 
266
 See infra Part V.A.3. 
267
 See text accompanying notes 257-58. 
268
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“[The Necessary and Proper 
Clause] is . . . in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”); see also 
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority’s decision striking down the mandate under the 
Commerce Clause will “hem in Congress’s capacity to meet the new problems 
arising constantly in our ever-developing modern economy”). 
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enumerated powers; it does not create an additional power.
269
 A 
regulation cannot “carry into execution” an enumerated power unless 
it aids in the effectiveness of an enumerated power.
 
Thus, individual 
statutes of the sort challenged in Lopez and Morrison should be per se 
unconstitutional because they simply regulate intrastate activities for 
their own sake, not in the service of some larger scheme of economic 
regulation.
270
 This approach is strongly supported by precedent and a 
majority of the Court.
271
 While the Justices disagree as to the extent to 
which a larger regulatory scheme is necessary or sufficient for 
constitutionality,
272
 they accept, as a general matter, that a regulation 
that is part of a larger scheme that regulates interstate commerce is 
more likely to be a valid exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers.273 
Additionally, it should not suffice that the intrastate regulation is 
part of a larger statutory scheme; the scheme should predominate over 
the intrastate regulation. This restriction serves two functions. First, it 
ensures that the intrastate activity is merely in service of the 
enumerated power of regulating interstate commerce and is not the 
predominant end that Congress intends to effect.
274
 This keeps 
Congress’s authority on the interstate level in accordance with its 
enumerated power and restricts it to only such intrastate regulations as 
may serve that larger scheme.
275
 Second, it ensures that Congress 
cannot regulate intrastate commerce merely by including the 
regulation within a statute that contains some interstate regulations. 
For example, a federal statute that banned the possession of a gun in a 
                                                          
269
 See text accompanying notes 257-58. 
270
 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (distinguishing Raich from Lopez and Morrison by 
noting that Lopez and Morrison involved statutes that were wholly independent 
of a larger statutory scheme regulating interstate commerce, whereas the 
regulation in Raich was part of a “concededly valid statutory scheme”); see also 
supra Part II.B.2. 
271
 See text accompanying notes 147-49. 
272
 Compare NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (arguing that even if 
the individual mandate was necessary to the regulatory scheme of the ACA, it 
was nonetheless improper), with 132 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the mandate was clearly constitutional under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause because it is an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme of 
interstate commerce). 
273
 See text accompanying notes 147-49. 
274
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause “does 
not license the exercise of any [powers] beyond those specifically enumerated”). 
275
 Id. 
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school zone would not be constitutional simply because a separate 
provision of the same statute provided for funding for the interstate 
highway system.
276
 The larger economic scheme must predominate, 
with the intrastate regulation as a mere tool toward the effectiveness of 
that regulation. 
2. “An Enumerated Power” 
Consistent with the Means-Ends Framework, the larger scheme 
itself must regulate interstate commerce. This provides the enumerated 
“end” that is the necessary prerequisite for a regulation justified by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.
277
 If the scheme does not further an 
objective that is economic or commercial in nature, then there is no 
enumerated power on which to anchor the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and, therefore, that individual regulation cannot be sustained 
under that power.
 278
 
3. Substantially Related 
The Court has long struggled over what degree of connection is 
required between a law and an enumerated power to be justified under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
279
 While the Court since McCulloch 
has recognized that the regulation need not be essential,
280
 many 
Justices have criticized the lenient rational-basis review that the Court 
has frequently applied.
281
 The application of an intermediate scrutiny 
                                                          
276
 There would also be an issue as to whether the regulation is “substantially 
related” to a larger economic scheme. This issue will be addressed more fully, 
infra Part V.A.3. 
277
 See text accompanying notes 257-58. 
278
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the authority “To make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated 
powers). 
279
 See supra Part II.A. 
280
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413, 416 (1819). 
281
 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 151-52 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (arguing against the majority’s use of a lenient form 
of rational-basis review when analyzing a statute under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause); 560 U.S. at 158 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Although the term ‘necessary’ does not mean ‘absolutely necessary’ or 
indispensable, the term requires an ‘appropriate’ link between a power conferred 
by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress.”); see also United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (stating that the Court will not “pile 
inference upon inference” to find a connection between an intrastate regulation 
and interstate commerce). 
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standard, which requires that the means “substantially relate[]” to an 
enumerated power,
282
 would resolve this issue by giving Congress 
leeway to choose reasonable means, while forbidding regulations with 
the remotest of connections to interstate commerce. 
Intermediate scrutiny has been most commonly applied in equal-
protection cases involving classifications based upon gender.
283
 The 
precise meaning of “substantially relate” is far from clear, and many 
have criticized the standard.
284
 However, intermediate scrutiny is the 
best standard of review in this situation for two main reasons. First, it 
constitutes a middle ground between the lenient rational basis 
standard, criticized by many of the Justices, and a strict scrutiny 
standard rejected in McCulloch,
285
 which would handcuff Congress to 
only means that are “narrowly tailored”286 or “absolutely 
necessary.”287 Second, the standard is firmly entrenched in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and supported by case law.
288
 Thus, despite the 
                                                          
282
 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979). 
283
 Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny 
to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 
186 (2003) (noting that “[a]ll of the justices agreed that the statute created a 
gender classification and intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of 
review”) (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60-61, 74-75 (2001)). 
284
 See, e.g., Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of 
Public Single-sex Elementary and Middle Schools, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1953, 2036 (2006) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is unpredictable and 
attempting to “systematize intermediate scrutiny in the context of single-sex 
public schools”); Deutsch, supra note 283, at 186, 187 (arguing that the 
application of intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications “continues to be 
troublesome” and that “[i]n reality, intermediate scrutiny in gender cases is a 
form of rational-basis review”). 
285
  See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (rejecting an 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause that would require that a 
Congressional regulation supported by that clause be “absolutely necessary” to 
enforcing an enumerated power). 
286
 Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that its regulation is narrowly 
tailored to a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 
543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of an equal 
protection challenge to a racial classification); United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (1999) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of a 
content-based restriction on speech). 
287
 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414. 
288
 The first case to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications was Craig 
v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Since 1982, intermediate scrutiny “has been the 
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uncertainty surrounding when a means is “substantially related,”289 the 
Court has a familiar framework and applications of that framework to 
draw from. 
This approach rejects a per se distinction between regulations of 
“economic and non-economic” activity or between regulations of 
“activity” and “inactivity” for a number of reasons. First, these 
classifications are difficult to make and, in many circumstances, make 
no meaningful difference.
290
 Second, such delineations are 
unnecessary under this approach to prevent a congressional police 
power. These distinctions were made as part of the “New Federalist” 
movement in the Court, which sought to prevent further expansion of 
congressional power toward a police power.
291
 The requirement that a 
regulation be part of a larger scheme and substantially relate to that 
scheme limits Congress’s discretion to choose means that bear a 
substantial relationship to their enumerated power.
292
 Thus, it is 
unnecessary to draw an arbitrary line between regulations of activity 
and inactivity or economic and non-economic activities. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, such limitations are not supported by the 
text of the Constitution.
293
 The Necessary and Proper Clause allows 
Congress to pass “all laws which are necessary and proper,” not “laws 
of economic activities.”294 Thus any intrastate regulation, so long as it 
                                                                                                                                         
consistent standard of a majority of the Court” in equal protection challenges to 
gender classifications. See Deutsch, supra note 283, at 195. 
289
 See note 284. 
290
 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2626 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
courts and Congress will have difficulty “distinguishing statutes that regulate 
‘activity’ from those that regulate ‘inactivity’”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that it is difficult to distinguish between economic and 
noneconomic activities). 
291
 See text accompanying notes 214-18, 228-32. 
292
 See supra Part V.A.1-2. 
293
 Siegel, supra note 200, at 819 (arguing that activity-inactivity distinction is not 
supported by the text of The Commerce Clause); Barnett, supra note 214, at 431 
(noting that many law professors have criticized the Court’s economic-
noneconomic distinction drawn in Lopez and Morrison as arbitrary and 
unrelated to the Constitution’s text); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that a categorical rule prohibiting Congress from regulating 
noncommercial activity is textually suspect considering that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause authorizes Congress to enact all powers that are necessary and 
proper). 
294
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see note 293. 
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substantially relates to a larger scheme that regulates interstate 
commerce, should be permissible under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.
295
 
B. Implementation 
Once there is a theoretical framework for the relationship between 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause—the 
Means-Ends Framework
296—and a test that reflects that framework,297 
the next step is to determine the best way to implement that test. First, 
it is important to note that the Means-Ends Framework does not create 
a bright-line rule. Due to the complexity of the issues and the 
competing values involved, a measure of judicial discretion is 
inevitable to find the proper balance between the principle of limited 
powers and congressional flexibility to fix the means to reach its 
enumerated ends. Furthermore, what means will effectively aid 
Congress in its regulation of interstate commerce will inevitably 
change over time with societal and technological developments.
298
 As 
such, a bright-line rule is inappropriate in this context. 
However, drawing from Professor J. Randy Beck’s work, The New 
Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, this Article 
proposes two major tools that the Court could use in applying the 
Means-Ends Framework.
299
 The Court should examine (1) whether 
Congress is really using an intrastate regulation to pursue an 
enumerated end or if it is simply using that as a pretext to bring about 
an end outside its authority,
300
 and (2) whether the regulation directly 
supports an enumerated power, or if it only does so through “numerous 
                                                          
295
 See text accompanying notes 257-60. 
296
 See supra beginning of Part IV. 
297
 See supra Part IV.A. 
298
 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority’s decision striking down the mandate under the 
Commerce Clause will “hem in Congress’s capacity to meet the new problems 
arising constantly in our ever-developing modern economy”); see also 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“[The Necessary and Proper 
Clause] is . . . in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”). 
299
 Beck, supra note 19, at 612-13. 
300
 Id.; see infra Part V.B.1 (describing the application of this tool in more detail). 
340 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 294 
intermediate or intervening causes.”301 The issues of “pretext” and 
“directness” would ensure that the intrastate regulation is actually a 
means to a larger regulation of interstate commerce, and that the 
intrastate regulation substantially relates to that scheme.
302
 
1. Pretext 
An analysis of congressional motivations in enacting a regulation 
of intrastate commerce would help the Court determine whether the 
larger statutory scheme actually regulates interstate commerce and 
whether the regulation of intrastate commerce is substantially related 
to that scheme.
303
 When making this inquiry, the Court should 
consider the regulation both objectively and subjectively; whether a 
reasonable legislator would view the intrastate regulation as means to 
bring about an enumerated end and whether the legislators who 
enacted the law sincerely believed that the intrastate regulation would 
bring about an enumerated end. This analysis ensures that, consistent 
with the Means-End Framework, Congress is using the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as a means to an enumerated power, not as a pretext to 
reach an end outside out of its authority. 
                                                          
301
 Beck, supra note 19, at 612-13; see infra PartV.B.2 (describing the application 
of this tool in more detail). Beck also argues that a regulation under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause must be “plainly adapted,” which he defines as a 
regulation that does “not require a sophisticated explanation.” Beck, supra note 
19, at 613. Such a requirement may be relevant in certain cases—if a 
sophisticated explanation is needed to explain the many intervening causes that 
connect the regulation to interstate commerce. However, the requirement sweeps 
too broadly. Considering the growing complexity of society and technology, a 
means may directly aid in an interstate regulation, but still require a 
sophisticated explanation. See text accompanying note 298. As such, a 
requirement that an intrastate regulation be “plainly adapted” to an enumerated 
power, as Beck defines it, does not strongly serve the goals of the Means-Ends 
Framework. 
302
 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. Rather, it is illustrative of tools the 
Court could use to help them analyze an intrastate regulation under the test 
proposed in Part V.A. Other factors that the Court may want to consider when 
applying the three-prong test include: how vital the intrastate regulation is to the 
proper functioning of the interstate regulation, whether Congress considered 
other less-intrusive means to reach the same the goal, and whether the intrastate 
regulation aids in the functioning of a key part of the interstate regulation or 
merely something peripheral to the overall scheme. 
303
 See supra Part V.A.2-3. 
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The Court would first analyze whether a reasonable legislator 
would view the intrastate regulation as likely to aid in a regulation of 
interstate commerce.
304
 The Court frequently employs an objective 
“reasonable person” analysis, making it a familiar tool for the Court to 
apply in this context.
305
 The Court would examine the intrastate 
regulation in relation to the larger economic scheme and ask, “would a 
[reasonable] legislator who honestly wanted to achieve a legitimate 
end within the scope of the enumerated powers really expect this 
measure” to aid in the execution of that enumerated power?306 If the 
answer is “yes,” then it is more likely that the regulation truly is a 
means to an enumerated end, and that it is substantially related to that 
end.
307
 
Next, the Court should explore the actual subjective purpose of the 
legislators who enacted the regulation and determine whether they 
intended the intrastate regulation to be a means to a regulation of 
interstate commerce or if the intrastate regulation was the end they 
desired to achieve.
308
 While attempts to determine congressional 
purpose have been criticized by some,
309
 it is a tool that the Court has 
                                                          
304
 Beck, supra note 19, at 612. 
305
 See e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (applying a 
reasonable person test to determine whether a picture of the Ten 
Commandments in a county courthouse violated the establishment clause); 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991) (applying a reasonable person test 
to determine whether a person has been seized under the Fourth Amendment); 
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 (1987) (applying a reasonable person test to 
determine whether a work has “serious literary, political, artistic, or scientific 
value” when applying the Miller test for allegedly obscene material). 
306
 Beck, supra note 19, at 612. 
307
 See supra Part V.A.2-3. 
308
 Beck explicitly rejects an approach that would analyze the “subjective good 
faith on the part of a large number of legislators.” Beck, supra note 19, at 612. 
However, for the reasons set forth in this paragraph, I believe such an inquiry, in 
addition to an objective analysis, may be useful in some cases. 
 
309
 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 638 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting [a] statute 
is . . . almost always an impossible task”); Robert Farrell, Legislative Purpose 
and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) 
(arguing that disagreement among the justices as to what constitutes “purpose” 
has led to “an inconsistent and unpredictable body of case law”). But see 
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 861-62 (noting that courts frequently inquire into 
the purpose of a government act and arguing that it must be a useful exercise, 
 
342 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 294 
frequently used in other areas of the law.
310
 If Congress’s predominant 
purpose was to regulate the intrastate activity and not interstate 
commerce, then it is likely that the regulation of interstate commerce 
does not predominate over the intrastate regulation.
311
 To determine 
legislative purpose, the Court has considered factors such as the 
legislative history of the statute
312
 and “the specific sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision.”313 Despite the criticisms of 
determining Congressional purpose, it would be an important tool in 
some cases to help the Court determine whether the intrastate 
regulation is genuinely being used as a means to an enumerated end. 
                                                                                                                                         
otherwise “the whole notion of purpose in law would have dropped into 
disrepute long ago”). 
310
 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 861 (writing that “governmental purpose is a key 
element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine”); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46-47 (2000) (writing that “courts routinely engage in [a 
purpose inquiry] in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of 
sifting abusive governmental conduct from that which is lawful”); see, e.g., 
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 881 (finding that the government had a purpose to 
promote religion based on the history of the plan to add a Ten Commandments 
statute to a courthouse in violation of the Establishment Clause); Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (finding that 
a facially neutral law that had a discriminatory effect on African Americans did 
not have a discriminatory purpose and therefore did not violate the equal 
protection); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (declaring that a provision regulating abortion is 
unconstitutional “if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking abortion”). 
311
 See supra Part V.A.3. 
312
 Many judges, following the lead of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, 
refuse to look at the legislative history of a statute. Nicholas R. Parrillo, 
Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative, The Judiciary, and 
the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J 266, 269 (2013). 
Justices who refuse to look at legislative history could still use the Means-Ends 
approach and focus solely on the objective relationship between the statute and 
an enumerated power and the context in which the bill was passed. See text 
accompanying notes 304-07. Legislative history, while a useful tool in the 
Means-Ends Framework, is not indispensable to its application. Therefore, this 
approach can still be applied successfully by “textualist” judges. 
313
 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. For example, in McCreary County, the town 
first displayed a large Ten Commandments picture in its courthouse and then 
changed the display two times to include other historical documents and the Ten 
Commandments. 545 U.S. at 851-58. The Court held that the original display, 
despite the subsequent changes, showed that the town had a purpose to endorse 
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 873-74. 
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2. Directness 
To further help determine whether the intrastate regulation 
substantially relates to the larger economic scheme,
314
 the Court 
should also examine how directly the intrastate regulation aids in the 
execution of the larger scheme.
315
 If the intrastate regulation only aids 
the larger scheme through a chain of causation or through “numerous 
intermediate or intervening causes,” then it is less likely that the 
intrastate regulation is substantially related to the scheme.
316
 Since 
“directness” is a term of degree, there is no bright-line rule to 
determine how direct the connection between the means and end must 
be to substantially relate.
317
 However, the more steps that are required 
to show that the intrastate regulation supports the larger scheme, the 
less likely it is permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
318
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Inquiries into “context” and “directness” are just two methods the 
Court could use to apply the Means-Ends Framework to ensure that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause provides only the means to the 
execution of an enumerated power and not an additional end.
319
 Over 
time, Congress’s commerce power has become its most expansive 
                                                          
314
 See supra Part V.A.3. 
315
 See Beck, supra note 19, at 611-12. While the Court in Wickard clearly rejected 
a distinction between regulations with direct and indirect effects on interstate 
commerce, see text accompanying note 80, the Court’s holdings in Lopez and 
Morrison, where it refused to “pile inference upon inference” to find a 
connection between an intrastate regulation and interstate commerce, suggest 
that the Court still considers relevant how direct the connection is between the 
means employed and the enumerated end. 
316
 See Beck, supra note 19, at 612. 
317
 Id. 
318
 Id. 
319
 See supra Part V.A (laying out the three-prong test for the Means-Ends 
Framework as (1) the regulation must be part of a larger statutory scheme that 
predominates over the individual regulation; (2) the legislative scheme must 
regulate interstate commerce; and (3) the regulation must substantially relate to 
the goals of the economic scheme); see note 302 (describing other factors that 
the Court might consider when applying the three-prong test of the Mean-End 
Framework). 
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power.
320
 Only by directly and explicitly addressing the Necessary and 
Proper Clause can the scope of federal power be definitively 
determined.
321
 The consistent tension in Commerce Clause cases has 
been between giving Congress flexibility to address the problems of 
the nation, while at the same time maintaining a federal government of 
limited and enumerated powers.
322
 This dilemma provides no easy 
bright-line solution and, like many other constitutional issues, will 
often turn on a case-by-case determination. 
The best way to make such a determination and to balance the 
competing interests of flexibility and limited government is to focus on 
the means-ends relationship between a particular regulation and a 
larger economic scheme.
323
 The Commerce Clause refers only to direct 
regulation of interstate commerce, and therefore congressional power 
under that Clause should be limited to direct control of those issues.
324
 
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress flexibility to 
select the means to meet its larger goals, but does not function as an 
additional enumerated power.
325
 The Necessary and Proper Clause 
imposes no limitations on what can be regulated, so long as it 
“executes” an enumerated power.326 Thus the Court’s distinctions 
between regulations of “activity and inactivity” and between 
“economic and non-economic” regulations are unsupported by the 
text.
327
 
                                                          
320
 Elizabeth Bondurant & Steven D. Henry, Constitutional Challenges to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 250 (2011); 
Josie George Richardson, Note, Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause—Let 
them Eat . . . Broccoli? 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 559, 585 (2013). 
321
 See Beck, supra note 19, at 581 (“Because the Necessary and Proper Clause 
represents the outer boundary of congressional authority, consideration of this 
provision necessarily illuminates discussions of state sovereignty and reserved 
powers.”). 
322
 See supra Part II.A (describing the tension in McCulloch between the fact that 
Congress is limited to its enumerated power and that Congress should have 
significant leeway to pick the means to enforce those powers). 
323
 See supra Part V. 
324
 See supra Part IV. 
325
 See supra Part IV. 
326
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power “to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” its enumerated 
powers) (emphasis added). 
327
 See supra Parts IV.B.1, V.A.3. 
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Recognizing that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides means, 
and not an additional end in itself, its proper role should be in direct 
aid of an enumerated power.
328
 As such, any intrastate regulation 
should be upheld only if it is predominated by a larger economic 
scheme and is substantially related to the regulation of interstate 
commerce.
329
 This approach allows the Necessary and Proper Clause 
to play its intended role of providing flexible means, without allowing 
it to impermissibly extend congressional power to the functional 
equivalent of a national police power. 
                                                          
328
 See supra Part IV. 
329
 See supra Part V. 
